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Introduction 
The broken model for financing long-term care services and 
supports (LTSS) burdens public programs and individuals. A flawed 
private long-term care (LTC) insurance market is limited, fails to 
mitigate financial burdens, and creates an unsustainable reliance on 
state Medicaid programs. Public insurance solutions alone are not 
feasible given increasing needs for LTSS, limitations of state budgets, 
benefit and qualifying criteria restrictions under Medicaid, and current 
policy proposals to reduce Medicaid funding. Despite these inherent 
problems, proposed solutions to finance LTSS have prioritized public 
and social insurance models while largely underestimating the role of 
private market tools. A viable solution requires a balanced approach 
that integrates a thriving private LTC insurance market while 
improving public options. This article proposes amending state 
legislation to initiate a remodeling of LTC insurance products to 
support a thriving private LTC insurance market capable of mitigating 
LTSS financial burdens. 
LTSS assist individuals with functional impairments that interfere 
with daily activities due to illness or disability.1 Among the twelve 
million individuals whom rely on LTSS, 6.7 million are over sixty-five 
years old.2 Policy makers and scholars have long recognized that an 
aging society will dramatically increase the burden on LTSS systems.3 
 
1. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO LONG-TERM 
SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (2013). 
2. Id at 3. 
3. Id. 
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In 2013, the Commission on Long-term Care made an unequivocal call 
to action: 
“Now is the time to put these new approaches and efforts in place 
if the coming generations of Americans are to have access to the array 
of LTSS needed . . . the need is great. The time to act is now.”4 
Financing LTSS has been an elusive challenge that permeates 
solutions to improve access to and quality of LTSS. No prior proposed 
solutions to this challenge have systematically examined LTC insurance 
as a mechanism to resolve LTSS financing challenges. The current LTC 
insurance market model is plagued with high premiums, low purchase 
rates, high rates of medical denials, and low profitability for insurers. 
Yet, these are symptoms of deeper issues that stem from state 
regulation of LTC insurance and are the root cause of market 
challenges. This article will systematically address three questions: 
 
1) What is  currently  causing the  private  LTC   insurance 
market to fail? 
 
2) What  is  the  mechanism  for   fixing  these  causes  and 
implementing change? 
 
3) What  are  the  points  of intervention  that could spur a 
thriving LTC insurance market? 
 
This article argues that current state legislation has led to 
unproductive underwriting practices, overly restrictive LTC insurance 
policy benefits and external incentives, and restricted profitability to 
create a sustainable market. As the mechanism for resolving market 
failures, this article proposes using the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Long-term Care Insurance Model Act 
and Regulation as catalysts to trigger broad adoption of amendments 
of key state legislation. This proposal capitalizes on the NAIC’s prior 
success to inform state law using model acts. The proposal targets three 
points of intervention: underwriting standards that impede access to 
LTC insurance policies; poorly designed benefit restrictions and 
external incentives that fail to motivate LTC insurance purchase by 
key populations; and failing to establish protective mechanisms to 
support LTC insurers. Addressing these failures through state 
legislation will increase purchase rates, leading to lower premiums, and 
create a thriving LTC insurance market – thus saving the LTC 
insurance market from its “death spiral.” 
This article provides an initial background to the current structure 
of LTSS, insurance, and regulation in Section II. Section III details the 
flaws in the current LTC insurance market, primarily focusing on the  
4. Id at 6. 
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cause and effect of poor purchase rates and market failure. Section IV 
will provide an overview of solutions to LTSS financing that were 
previously proposed. Section V will outline a proposal to amend model 
law to spur market reform as a last hope to saving private LTC 
insurance and financing LTSS. 
I. Long-term Care Services and Supports, Insurance, 
and Regulation 
A.  Long-term Care Services and Supports 
Long-term care services and supports (LTSS) are non-medical 
services to assist with activities of daily living (ADLs) and instrumental 
activities of daily living (IADLs).5 ADLs include bathing, dressing, 
eating, transferring, and walking.6 Comparatively, IADLs include meal 
preparation, money management, house cleaning, medication 
management, and transportation.7 LTSS include assistance at a range 
of levels depending on the individual’s needs, including part-time at 
home care, adult day care, and skilled nursing facilities.8 
Approximately twelve million Americans rely on paid LTSS.9 On 
average, sixty-nine percent of LTSS users will use some type of LTSS 
for a period of three years.10 Among individuals who rely on LTSS, 
seven million individuals (sixty percent) are older than sixty-five years 
old.11 The estimated number of older adults with severe LTSS needs is 
expected to “increase by 140 percent between 2015 and 2055,”12 in part 
due to the aging “baby boomer” generation. Increased needs for LTSS 
are matched by an increase in age related illnesses, including 
 
5. Glossary, LONG TERM CARE, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., 




8. See e.g. James D. Holt, Navigating Long-Term Care, 3 GERONTOLOGY & 
GERIATRIC MED. 1, 1-4 (2017). 
9. Vivian Nguyen, Long-Term Support and Services, AARP (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/ppi/201701/Fact%20Sheet%2
0Long-Term%20Support%20and%20Services.pdf. 
10. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS: LONG-TERM FINANCING 
(2014). 
11. Summary of Commission’s Findings, CAPITAL RETENTION, 
https://capitalretention.com/commissionsfindings/ (last visited Nov. 18, 
2018). 
12. Melissa M. Favreault et al., Financing Long-term Services and Supports: 
Option Reflect Trade-Offs for Older Americans and Federal Spending, 34 
HEALTH AFFAIRS 2181, 2181 (2015). 
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Alzheimer’s disease and dementias.13 Age associated illnesses, such 
arthritis, heart conditions, and diabetes, are the primary causes for 
physical functional impairment associated with LTSS use in adults over 
sixty-five.14 Among those turning sixty-five, seventy percent will need 
LTSS within their lifetime and twenty percent will need LTSS for more 
than five years.15 While eighty-two percent of elderly receive LTSS in 
the community,16 advancing age increases the likelihood that an 
individual will receive care within an institutional setting.17 
Since 2011, nearly 10,000 baby boomers turn sixty-five every day.18 
Baby boomers’ health and social histories are unique from preceding 
generations. Baby boomers’ self-reported health assessments show lower 
scores than previous generations.19 Socially, baby boomers are more 
likely to value individualism, have higher incomes, are less likely to be 
married, and have fewer children but more siblings.20 While two out of 
three baby boomers report that they expect to need LTSS, nearly one-
third do not have plans for how to pay for services.21 
The cost of LTSS varies according to the individual’s functional 
needs, service preferences, care setting, and geographic locations. The 
average cost of a private room in a skilled nursing facility is 
approximately $92,000 per year, compared to $44,000 per year for an 
assisted living facility.22 Institutional care makes up sixty-two percent 
of LTSS costs, the remaining costs are those provided in the community 
(e.g., at home nursing care), which average $20 per hour ($800 for a 
 
13. LONG-TERM CARE COMMISSION, supra note 1; ALZHEIMER’S ASS’N, 
ALZHEIMER’S FACTS AND FIGURES REPORT (2017). 
14. LONG-TERM CARE COMMISSION, supra note 1. 
15. AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, supra note 10. 
16. CONG. BUDGET OFF., RISKING DEMAND FOR LONG-TERM SERVICES AND 
SUPPORTS FOR ELDERLY PEOPLE, at 20 (2013). 
17. Approximately 13% of elderly over the age of 85 receive LTSS in 
institutional settings, compare to less than 2% of adults between 65-74 
years old. See id. at 21. 
18. Julie Robison et al., Long-Term Supports and Services Planning for the 
Future: Implications from a Statewide Survey of Baby Boomers and Older 
Adults, 54 GERONTOLOGIST 297, 299 (2014). 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 299. 
21. Id. at 304-305. 
22. Wendy Fox-Grage, Medicaid: A Last Resort for People Needing Long-
Term Services and Supports, AARP PUB. POL’Y INST. (Mar. 2017), 
https://www.aarp.org/ppi/info-2017/medicaid-a-last-resort-for-people-
needing-long-term-services-and-supports.html. 
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forty hour work week).23 On average, individuals who require LTSS do 
not have a sufficient income to cover the costs of LTSS for themselves 
or a loved one.24 Nursing home care costs are equivalent to 225% of the 
median income for individuals over sixty-five years old.25 
Total LTSS costs in the United States were $219.9 billion in 2012, 
approximately 9.3% of all personal health care spending.26 LTSS prices 
are expected to increase; between 2002 and 2012 price increases ranged 
between 1.6% (home health aide) to 5.1% (assisted living) a year.27 A 
majority of these costs are covered by Medicaid (sixty-two percent).28 
Among private sources, out-of-pocket spending (seventeen percent) is 
most common;29 LTC insurers pay for twelve percent of LTSS 
expenses.30 
Family members and informal (non-paid) caregivers serve a critical 
role in the larger LTSS system. Informal caregivers are responsible for 
up to fifty-five percent of LTSS provided to the elderly.31 In 2009, the 
monetary value of informal care was $450 billion.32 Informal care allows 
individuals to remain in their community longer and reduces direct 
LTSS expenses.33 While many informal caregivers do so because they 
prefer to be the one providing care to a loved one, a lack of access due 
to high expenses associated with LTSS is also a driving factor for the 
high rates of informal caregivers.34 Caregivers absorb costs and risks 
associated with providing care, including caregiver burden and 
opportunity costs (e.g., loss of employment and interruption of care for 
other dependents).35 The reliance on informal caregivers is becoming 
 
23. NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, NATIONAL SPENDING FOR LONG-TERM 
SERVICES AND SUPPORTS (LTSS), 2012 (2014); PAMELA DOTY & SAMUEL 
SHIPLEY, DEPT. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. OFFICE ASSISTANT SECRETARY 
FOR PLAN. AND EVALUATION, LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 1 (2012). 
24. Fox-Grage, supra note 22. 
25. Id. 
26. NAT’L HEALTH POL’Y FORUM, supra note 23. 
27. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 16, at 24. 
28. Id. at 25. 
29. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1. 
30. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 16, at 28. 
31. Id. at 31. 
32. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 14. 
33. Allison K. Hoffman, The Reverberating Risk of Long-Term Care, 15 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 57, 60 (2015). 
34. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 4. 
35. Allison K. Hoffman, Reimagining the Risk of Long-Term Care, 16 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 147, 153-154 (2016). 
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“increasingly untenable” given an aging society.36 The aging of the baby 
boomer generation will dramatically influence the number of available 
caregivers. The number of potential informal caregivers for each older 
adult will decrease from seven to less than three between 2015 and 
2050.37 
B.  LTSS Financing: Medicaid and LTC Insurance 
Individuals and families are unlikely to have sufficient income or 
savings to fully cover LTSS out-of-pocket.38 As described below, a 
minority of people own an LTC insurance policy.39 The broadly 
accepted misperception that health insurance and Medicare cover LTSS 
expenses prevents individual and familial preparation.40 This 
misunderstanding is highlighted in data reporting that individuals are 
misinformed regarding costs of LTSS and available insurers and payors 
that provide LTSS coverage.41 This section will provide an introduction 
on LTC insurance and Medicaid as the primary payor of LTSS. 
1. Private Long-term Care Insurance 
LTC insurance policies emerged in the market over thirty years 
ago, initially as “nursing home insurance” providing benefits to offset 
the cost of skilled nursing facilities.42 In the 1990s, insurers began selling 
comprehensive policies to cover institutional and community based 
care.43 By 2015, a majority of policies offered broader benefits including 
home care, with less than one percent of policies only covering nursing 
 
36. Id. 
37. Shana Siegel & Neil T. Rimsky, Where Do We Go From Here? Long-
Term Care in the Age of the Baby Boomers, 11 NAT’L ACAD. ELDER L. 
ATT’Y J. 49, 52 (2015). 
38. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1 at 6. 
39. Id. at 3. 
40. Id. at 13; Erica L. Reaves & MaryBeth Musumeci, Medicaid and Long-
Term Services and Supports: A Primer, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.kff.org/medicaid/report/medicaid-and-
long-term-services-and-supports-a-primer/; PAUL A. WERTSCH, COUNCIL 
ON MED. SERV., FINANCING OF LONG-TERM SERVICES AND SUPPORTS 1 
(2018). 
41. Galina Kahtutsky et al., What Do People Know About Long Term 
Services and Supports?, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV. (Sept. 1, 
2016), https://aspe.hhs.gov/basic-report/what-do-people-know-about-
long-term-services-and-supports. 
42. ERIC C. NORDMAN, THE STATE OF LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE: THE 
MARKET, CHALLENGES AND FUTURE INNOVATIONS, NAT’L ASS’N INS. 
COMMISSIONERS 2 (2016). 
43. Id. at 7. 
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home care.44 The LTC insurance market is largely an individual private 
market, in comparison to health insurance which relies on group and 
employer policies.45 Group policies were initially introduced into the 
LTC insurance market in 1987.46 Only twenty percent of employers with 
more than ten employees (.5% of all employers) offer LTC insurance.47 
LTC insurance is unique among its counterparts, adopting 
characteristics of health, life, and disability insurance.48 Life insurance 
provides coverage for a definitive loss (death) that occurs with 
predictable benefits, determined by the amount selected by the 
policyholder.49 Public and private health insurance cover losses that are 
highly likely to occur in an acute setting with services provided by 
trained professionals (i.e., physicians, nurses) within specialized settings 
(i.e., hospitals, medical centers).50 Finally, disability insurance provides 
coverage for an uncertain event with established benefits and a limited 
end-point according to the individual’s age (most policies end coverage 
once a policyholder is sixty-five years old).51 Private LTC insurance 
adopts the benefit trigger model used in disability insurance, the benefit 
features of health insurance, and the premium structure implemented 
in life insurance.52 
Approximately 7.2 million LTC insurance policies were in force in 
2014.53 As it is currently designed, LTC insurance is a product for the 
upper class and well educated. Individuals who purchase policies are 
more likely to be college-educated (sixty-eight percent of purchasers), 
 
44. Id. at 18. 
45. Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, The Private Market for Long-Term 
Care Insurance in the United States: A Review of the Evidence, 76 J. RISK 
& INS. 5, 10 (2009). 
46. Id. 
47. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 9. 
48. Kenneth S. Abraham, Note, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 UNIV. 
PA. L. REV. 653, 686 (2013). 
49. Lawrence A. Frolik, Private Long-Term Care Insurance: Not the Solution 
to the High Cost of Long-Term Care for the Elderly, 23 ELDER L.J. 371, 
376 (2016). 
50. See generally LOUIS C. GAPENSKI, UNDERSTANDING HEALTHCARE 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 42-44 (4th ed. 2007). 
51. Do Disability Benefits End at Age 65?, DISABILITY BENEFITS CTR., 
https://www.disabilitybenefitscenter.org/faq/do-disability-benefits-end-
at-age-65 (last visited Jan. 4, 2019). 
52. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4. 
53. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 8. 
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employed (sixty-eight percent of purchasers),54 and have relatives who 
have experienced LTSS needs.55 The average age of purchasers is fifty-
eight years old.56 Individuals with higher incomes are more likely to 
have LTC insurance than others.57 Approximately nineteen percent of 
adults over fifty-five years old with annual incomes over $100,000 have 
LTC insurance policies, while only around nine percent of individuals 
with incomes between $20,000 to $50,000 have LTC policies.58 Similarly, 
the average income of purchasers has increased from $27,000 in 1990 to 
$87,500 in 2010; this increase was also matched in average assets owned 
by the purchaser.59 
Individuals with LTC insurance policies receive more hours of paid 
LTSS than un-insured counterparts.60 Caregivers of individuals with 
LTC insurance provide different types of care as compared to their 
counterparts of individuals without LTC insurance, shifting care 
provided from hands-on intensive care to companion care.61 This has 
the effect of greatly reducing caregiver burden and restoring familial 
relationships.62 Average monthly savings for an individual with a policy 
using LTSS range between $3000 to $5000.63 For individuals living in a 
nursing home, the average monthly savings are $4838.64 The average 
purchaser, who enrolls at age sixty-five, pays approximately $52,000 in 
premiums and can be entitled to nearly $550,000 in maximum benefits 
at the age of eighty-two.65 Despite reducing unmet needs and providing 
monthly savings, LTC insurance policies still leave coverage gaps for 
individuals’ LTSS needs.66 
 
54. Id. at 20; WHO BUYS LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE? TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 
OF STUDY OF BUYERS AND NON-BUYERS IN 2015-2016, LIFEPLANS 15 (Jan. 
2017). 
55. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4. 
56. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 53. 
57. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4. 
58. Id. 
59. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 20. 
60. Id. at 24. 
61. Id. at 25. 
62. Id. at 42. 
63. Id. at 23. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 36. 
66. Kali S. Thomas & Robert Applebaum, Long-Term Services and Supports 
(LTSS): A Growing Challenge for an Aging America, 25 
GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. OF AMERICA 56, 57 (2015). 
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2. Medicaid LTSS Coverage 
Medicaid is a federal and state run program that provides health 
care benefits to individuals who meet means based eligibility 
requirements.67 Medicaid is the largest payor for health care and LTSS 
in the United States providing coverage for nearly seventy-three million 
individuals.68 In 2013, over seventeen million individuals with 
disabilities and adults over sixty-five years old (5.5% of the total 
population) relied on Medicaid.69 Approximately forty percent of these 
individuals were over the age of sixty-five.70 Medicaid, the primary 
source for financing LTSS in the United States, pays for over sixty 
percent of all LTSS expenses.71 In 2016, state and federal Medicaid 
expenditures for LTSS equaled nearly $167 billion, an increase from 
$159 billion in 2015.72 LTSS’ reliance on Medicaid cost federal and state 
Medicaid programs nearly $152 billion in 2014.73 
Medicaid eligibility criteria require individuals to demonstrate that 
their income and assets meet the “means test.”74 This means that the 
individual has less than a set amount in assets (usually less than 
$2000).75 An individual or family may “spend down” their assets to 
meet these requirements, by using up any assets that are over the 
threshold amount. Approximately ten percent of adults over fifty 
“spend down”76 resources to qualify for Medicaid to access services.77 
Nearly forty percent of individuals who “spend down” to meet Medicaid 
eligibility requirements are in the middle class.78 The 2005 Deficit 
Reduction Act created additional restrictions in order to close loopholes 
 
67. Medicaid Eligibility, MEDICAID, https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/ 
eligibility/index.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2018). 
68. Id. 
69. Fox-Grage, supra note 22. 
70. Id. 
71. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 16. 
72. Steve Eiken et al., Medicaid Expenditures for Long-Term Services and 
Supports in FY 2016, MEDICAID INNOVATION ACCELERATOR PROGRAM 
(May 2018), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/ltss/downloads/ 
reports-and-evaluations/ltssexpenditures2016.pdf. 
73. Fox-Grage, supra note 22. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Spending Down Assets to Qualify for Medicaid, ELDER LAW ANSWERS 
(Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.elderlawanswers.com/spending-down-assets-
to-qualify-for-medicaid-12003. 
77. Fox-Grage, supra note 22. 
78. Id. 
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in meeting the means test, including prohibiting individuals to transfer 
assets to family members or set up trusts.79 During the spend down 
period individuals must cover costs of LTSS until they meet eligibility 
requirements.80 
Medicaid coverage is incomplete in two aspects. First, the coverage 
provided under Medicaid limits access to services that are provided 
under state plans.81 State Medicaid plans must include nursing home 
care, but other services are optional.82 Reimbursement rates for 
Medicaid programs are typically set between ten and thirty percent 
below private pay rates for nursing homes.83 State plans may place 
limits on community-based programs.84 Enrollment caps for 
community-based services lead to waitlists and substandard care.85 
Additionally, Medicaid programs may exclude some disabling 
conditions or prohibit assistance with some daily activities.86 Second, 
individuals may go without access to appropriate care while working to 
meet the means tests to qualify. The reliance on Medicaid to provide 
financing for LTSS adds an upwards of 10,000 individuals per day 
without access to paid LTSS.87 
Medicaid programs have a direct impact on LTC insurance 
purchase rates due to a “crowd out effect.”88 Data demonstrates that 
the availability of Medicaid as a safety net reduces individual 
willingness to pay for long-term care insurance for all but the wealthiest 
individuals.89 Data from a 2007 study demonstrates that the broad 
 
79. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4. 
80. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 145. 
81. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note, 1 at 14. 
82. Id. 
83. Daniel Barczyk & Matthias Kredler, Evaluating Long-Term-Care Policy 
Options, Taking the Family Seriously, 85 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 766, 770 
(2017). 
84. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note, 1 at 3. 
85. Judy Feder, The Challenges of Financing Long-term Care, 8 ST. LOUIS U. 
J. HEALTH L. POL’Y 47, 55 (2014). 
86. See Hoffman, supra note 35, at 170. 
87. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 33. 
88. Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, The Interaction of Public and 
Private Insurance: Medicaid and the Long-Term Care Insurance Market, 
98 AM. ECON. REV. 1083, 1091-92 (2008). “Crowd out” is commonly 
referred to as the phenomenon that occurs, where, as a result of Medicaid 
as an option to pay for LTSS, individuals – particularly those in the 
middle class – are less like to purchase LTC insurance. Instead, individuals 
assume that when services are needed, they will be able to rely on 
Medicaid. See Frolik, supra note 49, at 377-79. 
89. Id. at 1092-1093. 
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availability of Medicaid leads to an unwillingness to purchase an LTC 
insurance policy.90 This study found that even when other market 
failures were resolved to provide an actuarially fair and comprehensive 
LTC insurance policy that individuals were unwilling to pay for 
insurance.91 Populations in the sixtieth percentile of wealth in men and 
seventieth percentile of wealth in women were the only reported 
exceptions to unwillingness to purchase LTC insurance when Medicaid 
is available.92 Without solutions to incentivize purchase rates of LTC 
insurance in non-wealthy populations, the rising demands on LTSS and 
reliance on Medicaid will place fiscal pressure on state and federal 
budgets.93 In 2003, a National Governors Association report indicated 
that states paid as much in LTSS costs as K-12 education.94 This 
financial pressure will squeeze out budgets for other priorities, 
particularly with looming pressure to “trim” Medicaid at the federal 
level.95 
C.  Regulation of Long-term Care Insurance 
LTC insurance is regulated primarily through state law, with 
minimal federal legislative or regulatory influence.96 Federal law 
establishes a bare-bone foundation for (1) minimum coverage provided 
by long-term care policies, and (2) generally defining long-term care 
policies.97 Federal law does not, however, regulate LTC insurance 
underwriting or coverage practices.98 Additionally, LTC insurance is not 
subject to major federal anti-discrimination laws including the 
 
90. Id. at 1093. 
91. Id. at 1092-1093. 
92. Id. at 1093. 
93. Brown & Finkelstein, supra note 45, at 2. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Jalayne J. Arias et al., The Proactive Patient: Long-term Care Insurance 
Discrimination Risks of Alzheimer’s Disease Biomarkers, 46 J. OF L. MED. 
& ETHICS 485, 485 (2018). 
97. Treatment of Qualified Long-Term Care Insurance, 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 7702(B)(c)(1) (2015). 
98. See id. 
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Affordable Care Act (ACA)99 and the Genetic Information Non-
Discrimination Act (GINA).100 Limited federal law is consistent across 
insurance types, leaving states at the helm of regulating insurance 
practices. 
The McCarren-Ferguson Act delegates the regulation of insurance 
to states.101 States have broad discretion to establish standards for 
insurers through legislation and regulation.102 Typically, this includes 
legislation and regulations, as well as oversight provided by the 
Insurance Commissioner.103 An insurance commissioner may have 
different powers in individual states, but they are generally charged 
with leading the state’s Department of Insurance and overseeing 
insurance regulation.104 This has led to varying approaches for standards 
and practices across states.105 These variations create barriers to broad 
and effective solutions at a national level. 
II. Broken Long-term Care Insurance Market 
LTC insurance is a failing market. Scholars, policymakers, and the 
media have regularly recognized the challenges burdening the market.106 
Prior criticisms of the market have focused on poor purchase rates and 
 
99. Long-Term Care Insurance Tax-Deductibility Rules – LTC Tax Rules, 
AM. ASS’N FOR LONG-TERM CARE INS., http://www.aaltci.org/long-term-
care-insurance/learning-center/tax-for-business.php (last visited Nov. 18, 
2018); The ACA prohibits health insurers from discriminating against an 
individual based on a preexisting condition for underwriting decisions. 
Prohibition of Preexisting Condition Exclusions, 45 C.F.R § 147.108 
(2015). 
The ACA prohibits health insurers from discriminating against an 
individual based on a preexisting condition for underwriting decisions. 
Prohibition of Preexisting Condition Exclusions, 45 § 147.108. 
100. GINA prohibits employers and health insurers from using genetic 
information, including family history, to discriminate against individuals. 
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 
Stat. 881 (2008). 
101. McCarren Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1012 (1945). 
102. Id. 
103. See About the Department, CAL. DEP’T INS., https://www.insurance.ca. 
gov/0500-about-us/02-department/ (last visited Oct. 12, 2018). 
104. About the NAIC, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONER, https:// 
www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2018). 
105. Arias et al., supra note 97. 
106. Frolik, supra note 49, at 414; Howard Gleckman, The Traditional Long-
Term Care Insurance Market Crumbles, FORBES (Sept. 8, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/howardgleckman/2017/09/08/the-
traditional-long-term-care-insurance-market-crumbles/#71eddbf63ec3. 
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limited policy values for individual purchasers.107 This section will 
highlight data to evaluate the causes and effects of essential flaws in 
the LTC insurance market, including poor purchase rates and market 
failures. 
A.  Poor Purchase Rates 
Among adults between the ages of sixty and sixty-five, only ten 
percent hold LTC insurance policies.108 Only 89,000 individuals 
purchased new LTC insurance policies in 2016, almost a fourteen 
percent drop from the number purchased in 2015.109 Declining insurance 
purchase rates have been attributed to multiple factors, including 
underwriting practices, insufficient benefit and incentive structures, and 
high premiums. 
1. Underwriting Standards 
Underwriting is the collection of individual information to evaluate 
an applicant’s risk for future benefit claims to determine eligibility and 
premium rates.110 Standard underwriting practices rely on collecting and 
evaluating an applicant’s “past and current use of health services, 
medical conditions, lifestyle, and limitations in physical and medical 
functioning.”111 While underwriting may lead to denials and 
prohibitively high premium rates, it also is critical for insurance market 
stability.112 Underwriting guards against adverse selection and protects 
insurers against profit losses resulting from actual claims exceeding 
projected or expected claims.113 
State law and regulation provides significant discretion to LTC 
insurers in the context of underwriting practices.114 Unlike health 
insurers, LTC insurers are broadly permitted to collect and use health 
information for underwriting decisions.115 Individuals with past medical 
histories may be denied a policy or face increased and prohibitively high 
 
107. Gleckman, supra note 107. 
108. Portia Y. Cornell et al., Medical Underwriting in Long-Term Care 
Insurance: Market Conditions Limit Options for Higher-Risk Consumers, 
35 HEALTH AFF. 1494, 1495 (2016). 
109. Gleckman, supra note 107. 
110. Helena Temkin-Greener et al., Long-term Care Insurance Underwriting: 
Understanding Eventual Claims Experience, 37 INQUIRY 348, 349 (2000). 
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premiums.116 Explicit legislative and regulatory provisions permitting 
medical underwriting117 exacerbate consequences of current practices. 
Insurers’ underwriting practices are proprietary information and are 
not easily accessible. However, publicly available guidance documents 
for purchasers and underwriters may provide insight on standards used 
by a specific company. For example, underwriter guides issued by 
insurers recommend careful observation for evidence of disability 
obtained through in-person observation and tailored interview 
questions to elicit risk for a collection of named conditions.118 Guides 
also provide lists of uninsurable conditions, commonly known as 
“knock-out” conditions. These conditions include AIDS, Alzheimer’s 
disease, uncontrolled depression, diabetes (if outside weight 
parameters), and some organ transplants.119 When a knock-out 
condition does not immediately disqualify an individual from LTC 
insurance, other risk factors may lead to varying rates based on 
“preferred” or risk status.120 
Approximately twenty-four percent of individuals who apply for 
LTC insurance are denied a policy due to medical underwriting.121 
Individuals who are in the target population for LTC insurance 
(between the ages of sixty and seventy-one), are likely to experience 
higher rates of denial (up to forty percent).122 Several factors are most 
influential in determining eligibility, including age and medical history 
of diabetes or stroke.123 When controlled for other factors, “each ten-
year increase in age significantly decreased approval probability.”124 
Among applicants over eighty years old, forty-four percent are denied 
coverage, compared to less than seven percent of those under forty-five 
years old.125 A medical history of diabetes and stroke were the most  
116. See id. at 486. 
117. See e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-1406 (2011). 
118. Long Term Care Insurance Underwriting Guide, GENWORTH FIN., at ii 
(2007), http://www.resourcebrokerage.com/pdfs/ltci/underwriting/ 
genworth.pdf. 
119. Id. at vi; See Underwriting Guidelines for the Enhanced Care Benefit 
Rider and Long Term Care Acceleration of Death Benefit Rider, 
METLIFE, https://croweandassociates.com/wp- content/uploads/2016/ 
07/FIX_ECB_UW_Flyer.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2018). 
120. GENWORTH FIN., supra note 119, at iv; Temkin-Greener et al., supra note 
111, at 351. 
121. Cornell et al., supra note 109, at 1495-1496. 
122. Id. at 1500. 
123. Id. at 1498. 
124. Id. 
125. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 
RESEARCH BRIEF 6 (2012). 
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influential in adversely affecting approval ratings in comparison to 
history of other chronic diseases.126 Individuals who are extremely obese 
or underweight had similar rates of denial.127 Lastly, recent data 
demonstrates that parental medical history may now also influence 
underwriting practices, particularly when considering premium rates.128 
The denial rates-based health information provides no evidence on 
the accuracy of actuarial practices. At least one study has shown that 
underwriting practices, including the use of knock-out conditions, does 
not accurately predict high users of LTSS who would be “high risk” 
policy holders.129 A simulation of underwriting practices demonstrated 
that individuals who would be rejected from policies were not 
consistently likely to have higher uses of LTSS.130 Inaccurate 
underwriting practices impede access to LTC insurance without 
appropriate justification and unnecessarily narrow the population of 
potential purchasers. 
Adverse decisions based on health information may appear 
discriminatory. However, discriminatory behavior is consistent with risk 
classification practices that are broadly accepted under the guise of 
efficiency.131 Risk classification practices provide insurers with 
information to determine eligibility and premiums that are consistent 
with an individual’s risk for loss covered under the relevant policy.132 
Insurers use individual information to identify risk of loss for 
underwriting practices protects the insurer and its pool of insured. At 
the federal level, across insurance types, only four statutes and one 
regulation have placed limits on insurers’ use of individual information 
in underwriting.133 None of these federal laws extend protections to LTC 
insurance.134 
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131. Ronen Avraham et al., Understanding Insurance Antidiscrimination 
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2. Policy Benefits and External Incentives 
Insufficient policy benefits and external incentives have limited the 
perceived value of LTC insurance policies to potential purchasers.135 
Benefit triggers serve as an additional barrier to claiming benefits for 
LTSS. Most LTC insurance policies do not cover all costs incurred by 
LTSS users due to benefit limits and elimination periods.136 As a result, 
individuals and families remain responsible for some out-of-pocket 
expenses associated with LTSS.137 This, in combination with a lack of 
insufficient external incentives (e.g., tax incentives), limits the appeal 
of LTC insurance, particularly those who have other financial priorities 
that take the place of monthly premiums.138 
a. Benefits 
Individuals with policies are not free from financial responsibility 
for LTSS. Benefit triggers, elimination periods, and benefit caps limit 
the portion of LTSS expenses covered and protect insurers from 
excessive losses due to claims.139 These policy mechanisms reduce the 
benefits available to policy holders, adversely impacting the value of 
the policy to a potential purchaser. 
“Benefit triggers” are qualification criteria a policyholder must 
meet to make a claim for LTSS benefits under an LTC insurance 
policy.140 Benefit triggers are met when an individual has impairment 
that interferes with managing ADLs as determined by a licensed 
professional (i.e., physician, nurse, social worker).141 In the case of 
cognitive impairment, supervision and verbal cueing are sufficient to 
meet benefit triggers.142 If a policy is “tax qualified,” benefits are 
triggered when a policy holder is unable to perform at least two ADLs 
for a period of at least 90 days.143 Insurers are prohibited from 
conditioning eligibility of benefits on prior hospitalization or other “high 
level” institutional care.144 Insurers are required to disclose benefit  
135. ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR PLANNING AND EVALUATION, CHOOSING LONG-
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triggers for policy holders.145 Benefit triggers create a barrier by which 
insurers can decline coverage. A lack of trust in insurers and anecdotal 
evidence of unjustified adverse coverage decisions may discourage 
individuals from purchasing LTC insurance.146 
Most policies do not provide coverage immediately upon meeting 
criteria for benefit triggers.147 Elimination periods, also referred to as 
deductibles or waiting periods, require that an individual has 
experienced impairment for a specified number of days before coverage 
is provided.148 Elimination periods are on average ninety-three days,149 
but range from twenty to 100 service or calendar days.150 As a result, 
even individuals who have invest in LTC insurance will need to rely on 
out-of-pocket payments for LTSS until they meet the elimination period 
requirements. 
Benefit limits establish thresholds for costs covered daily, annually, 
and within a lifetime. Most LTC insurance policies place caps on the 
costs covered, which will not meet the full cost of care.151 In 2015, the 
average daily benefit limits were $159 for nursing home care and $152 
for home care.152 Additionally, insurers are unlikely to sell policies 
without a benefit duration cap, averaging four years, to avoid liability 
for an unlimited period.153 This has been a change in policy design since 
the 1990s. In 1990, thirty-three percent of policies offered lifetime 
benefits and, in 2015, this declined to eleven percent.154 Benefit duration 
caps are inconsistent with data demonstrating that twenty percent of 
LTSS users will need services for more than five years and another 
twenty percent will need services for between two and five years.155 
Similar to elimination periods, the use of benefit limits can discourage 
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potential purchasers, given the continued need for out-of-pocket 
payment for expenses. 
b. External Incentives 
External incentives, including tax benefits, can be beneficial to 
offset the costs associated with purchasing an LTC insurance policy. 
However, tax incentives have yet to motivate purchase rates in the 
middle class.156 Current federal policies permit individuals to include 
premiums for tax-qualified policies as part of medical expense tax 
deductions.157 An individual can deduct medical expenses that are 
greater than 7.5% of their income in 2017 and 2018.158 Beginning in 
2019, deductions will only be available for medical expenses that exceed 
ten percent of an individual’s income.159 In addition to federal tax 
incentives, twenty-four states offer tax incentives that reduce the 
average tax premium costs by an average of five percent.160 
Additionally, individuals who purchase “tax-qualified” policies are 
not required to report benefits as income.161 A policy is tax-qualified if 
it meets regulated criteria, including: (1) the policy only provides 
coverage for LTSS; (2) the policy is guaranteed renewable; (3) the 
benefits are triggered by impairment interfering with two ADLs; (4) the 
policy has requirements that chronic illness or disability continues for 
at least ninety days; and (5) the policy’s benefits are triggered by 
cognitive impairment only when the impairment requires “substantial 
supervision.”162 Additionally, tax-qualified policies must include 
inflation protection, dramatically increasing the cost of premiums.163 
This incentive does not help offset premium costs for the years before 
an individual claims their benefits. As a result, this benefit may increase 
adverse selection by not encouraging individuals to purchase a policy 
prior to identifying a potential need for LTSS. Insurers also cite 
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requirements to meet the criteria as impediments to innovative product 
design.164 
3. High Premiums 
High premiums are simultaneously a cause and effect of low 
purchase rates. The average annual policy premium was $2772 in 
2015.165 Premium rates vary depending on individual risk profiles and 
the benefits selected by the policy holder.166 Once a risk profile is 
determined through underwriting, an insurer will make an eligibility 
determination and offer the policy to accepted candidates based on 
specified premium rates.167 Some insurers will assign the individual to a 
rate class.168 For example, an individual who is high risk may be 
assigned to a “lower preference” category that assigns higher 
premiums.169 Premiums rates will also differ based on an individual’s 
benefit elections (i.e., length of coverage, benefit limits, covered 
services).170 For example, an individual’s age at the time of enrollment 
and selecting inflation protection can dramatically influence a 
premium.171 An enrollee who purchases a policy at age fifty for $200 
daily benefits for four years of coverage will pay an average of $4349 in 
an annual premium with inflation protection.172 Without inflation 
protection, the annual would be $1294. The same policy would be 
$13,500 and $8146 respectively for an individual who is seventy-five at 
the time of enrollment.173 If an individual enrolled at fifty-five and then 
sought benefits at age eight-five, the policyholder would have paid over 
$81,000 in premiums, assuming that rates were not raised. In 2012, 
ASPE reported that in the preceding ten years almost all LTC insurers 
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had substantially increased their rates.174 Similar data reported that 
between 2010 and 2015 premiums increased by nineteen percent.175 
High premium rates are a significant contributor to low purchase 
rates.176 The high cost of LTC insurance narrows the pool of individuals 
who would be financially suitable for purchasing an LTC insurance 
policy. Only approximately forty-five percent of individuals have 
sufficient incomes and assets to be financially suitable candidates for 
LTC insurance.177 The most conservative recommendations indicate 
than an individual is financially suitable if (1) LTC insurance premiums 
would make up less than five percent of the individual’s income, and 
(2) the individual has over $50,000 in assets.178 Purchasers on average 
have an income of $87,500 and eighty-two percent of purchasers have 
assets valued over $100,000.179 Among individuals who are financially 
suitable for LTC insurance policies, only sixteen percent of those over 
sixty-five and five percent of those between forty-five and sixty-five 
years old have policies.180 Non-buyers specifically reference competing 
demands and other priorities for finances.181 This sentiment is further 
reflected in a continued decline in purchase rates in the middle class.182
  
B.  Market Failures 
Market sustainability has been a critical flaw for LTC insurance. 
The sustainability of an insurance product relies on the willingness of 
individuals to pay for it.183 LTC insurance, as described above, has 
struggled to incentive purchases. In the 1980s and the 1990s, the private 
LTC insurance market saw a growth.184 In 2002, approximately 100 
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insurers were actively selling LTC insurance policies, but by 2012, this 
number dropped to twelve.185 Insufficient profits are the most cited 
reason for insurers’ decisions to leave the market.186 Low purchase rates 
have individual and societal consequence, as well as major consequences 
for the sustainability for the market based on loss of profits. 
Actuarial sustainability requires that revenues (through collected 
premiums) must be ample enough to meet the needs of future payouts 
(claims).187 A 2016 NAIC Report on the market reported that current 
earned premiums total under $12 billion, in contrast to the $28 billion 
earned in group life insurance.188 Despite the decline in LTC insurance 
policy purchases and premiums collected, the number of claims has 
continued to increase.189 As a result, loss ratios (the difference between 
the claims paid to the premiums collected) have steadily increased 
reflecting data that actual claims have exceeded expected claims.190 
1. Actuarial Challenges 
LTC insurance actuarial analysis faces unique challenges to 
maintain sustainable loss ratios. The market has struggled to accurately 
price policies and anticipate costs of claims.191 Predictors for use of 
LTSS are not well described.192 As a result, collected health and personal 
information to determine risk may not be sufficient for a full actuarial 
analysis. Accuracy in actuarial analysis is further complicated because 
of significant uncertainties unique to LTSS, including individual 
preferences and the availability of informal caregivers to defer the need 
for paid services. LTC insurance assumes the risk for care which is 
provided in multiple settings (home or institution), LTSS is labor 
intensive but does not always require highly skilled caregivers, the 
period of care is unpredictable, and the potential risk of needing access 
to coverage is uncertain. Adverse selection and more hazards contribute 
to limitations of actuarial analysis in LTC insurance. 
As a voluntary program, LTC insurers are exposed to increased 
risks of adverse selection.193 Adverse selection is the use of information 
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unknown to the other party (here, the insurer) to inform a decision.194 
For purposes of LTC insurance, adverse selection refers to the 
population of individuals who seek LTC insurance after learning 
information that increases their risk of LTSS need in the future.195 High 
rates of adverse selection increase the proportion of individuals who are 
“high risk” policyholders within an insured pool.196 An insurance pool 
with an increase proportion of “high risk” policyholders negatively 
influences the risk loss ratio, due to an increased demand for claims, 
ultimately resulting in high premiums rates.197 
“Moral hazard” references the concept that an individual with 
insurance protection will be more likely to use services or engage in 
risky behavior, than they would without a policy.198 Moral hazard is 
distinct in LTC insurance. First, individual preference is likely to inform 
the type and location of care sought under an LTC insurance policy 
benefit. It is feasible to think that having an LTC insurance policy 
would result in utilization of more expensive care.199 Second, having a 
policy increases the access to and availability of types of services, in 
comparison to limited services provided under Medicaid programs.200 
And finally, informal caregivers may simultaneously provide care and 
serve as decision makers for the type and level of LTSS.201 Elimination 
periods may serve as a counter to moral hazard risks by encouraging 
policyholders and caregivers to explore less expensive services. Yet, this 
does not eliminate the possibility that once coverage is available an 
individual will select more expensive LTSS. Moral hazards increase the 
complexity of actuarial analysis. 
2. Market Instability for Policyholders 
In 2016, only seventeen insurers sold LTC insurance policies;202 
another report cites that in 2012 only twelve insurers remained in the 
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market.203 This is a sharp decline from the nearly 100 insurers selling 
LTC insurance products in 2002.204 The declining number of insurers in 
the market hinders access due to a limited supply, also increasing 
premium rates. The consequences of an insurer no longer offering LTC 
insurance policies or leaving the market likely informs non-purchasers’ 
opinions about the value and security of a potential policy. However, 
purchasers are protected from losing the value of their policy in the 
circumstance where an insurer “leaves” the market. An insurer may 
leave the market either by suspending sales of new LTC insurance 
policies or by going bankrupt.205 If an insurer suspends policies sales, no 
longer selling new policies, the company must honor the individual’s 
policy under Guaranteed Renewable Clauses.206 The Guaranteed 
Renewable Clauses required under state law prohibit insurers from 
canceling a policy.207 Therefore, in this circumstance, an individual 
purchaser would still have coverage under their policy according to the 
agreed terms. If an insurer goes bankrupt, the Insurance Guarantee 
Pool protects the purchaser.208 In this situation, two outcomes may 
arise: first, another insurer could purchase the bankrupting insurers’ 
assets and would be required to honor the policies purchased.209 Second, 
if another insurer does not purchase the assets, the state-run Insurance 
Guarantee Pool will honor the liabilities of an insurance policy up to a 
specified amount.210 However, the rate of insurers leaving the market 
raises concerns about the viability of private LTC insurance, as it is 
currently modeled. 
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III. Prior Solutions 
Challenges associated with LTSS financing are not new and 
multiple scholars and policy makers have proposed solutions. However, 
none of these solutions have yet to fully address the issues plaguing the 
system. New proposals must incorporate prior lessons learned to 
develop feasible solutions that will influence LTSS financing. This 
section will examine prior proposals, including a critical assessment of 
why proposals were less successful. Proposals vary as to (1) promoting 
public or private insurance solutions; (2) the beneficiary of benefits 
provided under insurance (i.e., the care-recipient or “next-friend”);211 
and (3) the potential use of innovative structures (i.e., hybrid 
products). This section highlights some key proposals but does not 
cover all solutions. International models, including those implemented 
in Germany and Japan, have also been raised as models for financing 
LTSS through social models.212 Because they are less feasible to 
implement, models that rely on a health care system which greatly 
differs from the United States’ health care system will not be reviewed 
here. Instead, key details of the CLASS Act, the 2013 Report by the 
Commission on Long-term Care, Partnership Programs, Hybrid 
Products, and the integration of family and friends in developing 
solutions will be reviewed. 
A.  The CLASS Act 
In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) 
efforts to reform health care included the Community Living Assistance 
Service and Supports Act (CLASS Act).213 As a final priority of Senator 
Edward (Ted) Kennedy, the CLASS Act aimed to provide a federal 
voluntary LTC insurance program for individuals needing LTSS.214 The 
CLASS Act targeted the needs of the middle class by providing an 
affordable option to enroll in LTC insurance and prepare for future 
LTSS expenses.215 The CLASS Act was a controversial measure prior 
to its passage, even along party lines. Just four months before the ACA 
was signed into law, eleven Democrats urged Senate leadership to 
remove the CLASS Act from the ACA before passage.216 Critics 
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questioned the actuarial soundness of the proposed program.217 They 
argued that the bill did not have sufficient funding for marketing 
necessary to promote participation and that it lacked sufficient 
eligibility requirements.218 Despite these criticisms, the CLASS Act was 
kept as part of the ACA and was signed into law in March 2010.219 
The CLASS Act sought to establish a federal voluntary insurance 
program, enrolling participants through employers who elected to 
participate.220 Employees of participating employers would be 
automatically enrolled unless they opted out, modeled after retirement 
savings programs.221 Consistent with the group insurance model, 
underwriting would not be used to determine eligibility or premiums.222 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) would be 
responsible for establishing premium rates according to age of enrollees, 
with nominal rates for individuals who were below the poverty line and 
students.223 Enrollees in the insurance program would receive cash 
benefits.224 Amounts would have been determined according to 
functional need, but be no less than $50 per day without aggregate or 
lifetime limits.225 Enrollees would become eligible for benefits after five 
years of paying premiums if unable to perform at least two ADLs.226 
Finally the CLASS Act placed significant limitations on the program’s 
ability to increase premiums, including barring a raise of premiums for 
individuals over sixty-five or who are no longer employed.227 The 
CLASS Act relied on the Secretary of HHS to implement the program 
and structure it to remain solvent over a seventy-five-year period 
funded entirely through premiums.228 
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Shortly after the ACA’s enactment, the Secretary of HSS 
determined that the CLASS Act was actuarially insolvent.229 A financial 
analysis of the program determined that in the initial nine years of the 
program there would be a net Federal savings of approximately $38 
billion due to the five-year vesting period.230 The savings from the 
program would decline beginning in 2015 as enrollees begin using 
benefits.231 Projected benefits would exceed premium revenues 
beginning in 2025 leading to a Federal net cost for the program long 
term.232 In addition to failing to meet the CLASS Act’s requirement for 
solvency over a seventy-five-year period, the program would fail to 
significantly increase participation in LTC insurance.233 Approximately 
two percent of potential participants (an estimated 2.8 billion) were 
projected to enroll by the third year, compared to the four percent of 
potential participants enrolled in private insurance through 
employers.234 The estimated average premium needed to adequately 
fund the program was $240 per month, given the estimated low 
participation rate.235 
The program’s flaws resulted from interconnected consequences of 
a voluntary program, without a federal subsidy to encourage 
enrollment, that lacked a mechanism to screen for high risk 
participants, leading to a high risk of adverse selection.236 Adverse 
selection was determined to be the nail on the actuarial coffin for this 
program.237 The lack of underwriting and expected higher premiums 
was would have likely deterred healthy individuals from enrolling in the 
program.238 Additionally, there was no method to prevent already 
disabled individuals from enrolling and seeking benefits once they have 
vested.239 The program, offering $50 per day benefits, would have 
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difficulty competing with private LTC insurance with higher daily 
benefits which would be more appealing to healthy individuals seeking 
policies. As a result, those who would have most incentive to enroll 
would be those who are already in need of or know they will have a 
high risk for needing LTSS in the near future – a trait that would create 
the “insurance death spiral.”240 Ultimately, the Administration 
determined that this program could not succeed under the statutory 
requirements; the CLASS Act was repealed in 2012.241 
B.  Commission for Long-term Care Services and Supports 
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 (Relief Act) simultaneously 
repealed the CLASS Act and created the Commission on Long-term 
Care (LTC Commission).242 The Relief Act mandated that the LTC 
Commission develop a “plan for the establishment, implementation, 
and financing of a comprehensive, coordinated, and high-quality 
system” for LTSS.243 The LTC Commission released its report to 
Congress in September 2013 with recommendations on service delivery, 
the workforce, and financing.244 Unlike other sections of its report, which 
included specific and actionable recommendations, the LTC 
Commission was unable to reach consensus on a single approach to 
financing LTSS.245 The LTC Commission offered two alternate 
approaches. The distinctions between the approaches reflect tensions 
over what to prioritize: solutions to improve the private insurance 
market or public solutions through social insurances.246 The LTC 
Commission simultaneously recognized limitations of government 
programs serving as the safety net given budget constraints and argued 
for a more robust private insurance market and emphasized LTSS as a 
social challenge requiring a societal solution.247 The proposed solutions 
reflected the tension over public versus private market priorities. 
1. Commission on Long-term Care: Approach A 
Approach A recommended strengthening the private market 
through individual and market incentives.248 The LTC Commission 
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proposed a tax preference through retirement and health accounts by 
allowing individuals to pay for LTC insurance premiums by 
withdrawing from 401(k) or other retirement funds or by creating a 
subsidy to pay for premiums through Social Security distributions.249 
Other components of the proposal included promoting hybrid products 
through a change of tax law and supporting Long-term Care 
Partnership Programs (described in further detail below). To promote 
market incentives the LTC Commission proposed removing regulatory 
burdens that are hampering private insurance carriers but did not 
specify which regulations were barriers.250 Finally, the LTC Commission 
recommended addressing Medicaid “crowd out” by increasing 
qualification criteria to encourage individuals to take responsibility for 
preparing for the future cost of care.251 
Among their recommendations, only the shift in Medicaid 
qualification criteria would influence purchase rates in the middle class. 
Tying LTC insurance purchase rates to 401(k), life insurance, or 
annuity assumes that purchasers have resources to invest in these 
products, which have largely been accessible only to those with 
significant incomes and assets. As a result, these products are unlikely 
to be available to a majority of individuals. For example, in 2017 only 
about one-third of individuals were contributing to a 401(k) account, 
even though seventy-nine percent of individuals have employers who 
are offering 401(k) benefits.252 Moreover, offering additional incentives 
does not address limitations of prior tax incentive models that were not 
successful in improving purchase rates, particularly for the middle class. 
The LTC Commission’s recommendations failed to evaluate the core 
issues limiting the private LTC insurance market. 
2. Commission on Long-term Care: Approach B 
Approach B proposed two models to offer social insurance. First, 
the LTC Commission proposed a comprehensive LTSS benefit in 
Medicare Part A, triggered by physician certification that an individual 
meets criteria.253 Under this proposal an individual would meet criteria 
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days and were expected to continue to need services.254 Individuals 
whose mental or cognitive health interfered with independence would 
also meet criteria.255 Benefits would cover “reasonable and necessary 
LTSS.” For example, skilled nursing facility care, home health care, 
adult day center services, and respite care options to support family or 
other volunteer caregivers would be covered.256 The LTC Commission 
proposed covering costs associated with the new benefits through an 
increased Medicare payroll tax or the creation of a premium. The LTC 
Commission recognized that because not all people who need LTSS are 
Medicare eligible, some consideration needed to be given to expanding 
eligibility for individuals who meet criteria but do not otherwise qualify 
for Medicare.257 
The LTC Commission’s second proposed model developed a basic 
LTSS benefit within Medicare that would provide limited catastrophic 
coverage.258 Under this proposal, individuals would be responsible for 
providing private coverage or otherwise covering LTSS costs that do 
not constitute financially “catastrophic” risks.259 Individuals would 
qualify for benefits when they met a “specified threshold of functional 
impairment” after a waiting period.260 The benefit would be a specified 
dollar amount per day according to the level of impairment, individuals 
would be able to elect a direct pay for service benefits instead of a cash 
benefit.261 To pay for this proposal, the LTC Commission recommended 
a surcharge on income tax for individuals near or at retirement age.262 
These proposals provided potentially viable public options to 
improve access to LTSS through a federal program, Medicare. However, 
despite emphasizing the potential role of social insurance, the LTC 





257. To qualify for Medicare Part A, individuals must be older than 65, have 
received disability benefits for more than 24 months, or receive regular-
dialysis or have had a kidney transplant. CTR FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, ORIGINAL MEDICARE (PART A & B) ELIGIBILITY AND 
ENROLLMENT (last visited Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/ 
Medicare/EligibilityandEnrollment/OrigMedicarePartABEligEnrol/inde
x.html; LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8. 
258. LONG-TERM CARE COMM’N, supra note 1, at 8. 




Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
The Last Hope:  How Starting Over Could Save Private Long-Term Care 
Insurance 
157 
address LTSS needs alone.263 As such, private insurance and Medicaid 
will continue to serve critical roles in financing services.264 Given this 
reality, to otherwise be successful, these approaches require that a 
thriving private LTC insurance model be available to reduce the burden 
on social programs. 
3. Additional Recommendations, Limitations, and Challenges 
The LTC Commission provided recommendations outside the two 
larger approaches for changes to the current system, including 
improving benefits for individual who need LTSS to continue 
employment, amending Medicare requirements for skilled nursing 
facility coverage, and reevaluating Medicare coverage for home or 
community-based services.265 The LTC Commission’s potential 
approaches were broad sweeping. In the current political dynamic, with 
high tensions over publicly funded state programs (i.e., Medicaid), 
implementing LTC Commission’s recommendations would likely not be 
feasible. The approaches also lack critical details, particularly regarding 
the private market, to operationalizing proposals. A lack of a clear 
recommendation from the LTC Commission runs the risk of piecemeal 
adoption of solutions without evaluating the larger issues that 
undermine the potential promise of a consistent and balanced solution. 
C.  Partnership Programs 
The Long-term Care Insurance Partnership Program (Partnership 
Program) began with Programs in four states in the 1980s (California, 
Connecticut, Indiana, and New York).266 The Federal Deficit Reduction 
Act (2005) expanded the program nationally.267 The LTC Commission 
also reiterated recommendations for support of Partnership Programs 
in 2013.268 A Partnership Program attempts to reduce the burden on 
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specifically encouraging the middle class who would otherwise rely on 
Medicaid.270 
Partnership Programs are federally-supported, but state-
operated.271 In states with Partnership Programs, individuals who 
purchase a tax-qualified LTC insurance policy may still qualify for 
Medicaid after policy benefits have been depleted.272 Participants 
benefit from the program through a mitigated spend down requirement 
to meet Medicaid means eligibility tests.273 An individual with a 
qualified LTC insurance policy receives a dollar-for-dollar asset 
protection for each benefit dollar received under the LTC insurance 
policy.274 For example, if an individual purchases a policy, then receives 
$50,000 in benefits under that policy before applying for Medicaid 
coverage, the individual is permitted to have the maximum state 
designated assets plus $50,000 to qualify under the means test for 
Medicaid.275 
Nearly every state has implemented Partnership Programs.276 
Despite the widespread adoption, Partnership Programs have 
demonstrated a modest effect on LTC insurance purchase rates.277 
Additionally, the programs have not successfully impacted purchase 
rates in the middle class.278 Partnership Programs have had the most 
impact on individuals with high asset levels, above the eightieth 
percentile of asset ownership.279 The lack of success may be related to 
under-education of individuals who would be appropriate candidates. 
Recent reports demonstrate that up to seventy-five percent of 
individuals over seventy-five years old are not aware that their state 
offers a Partnership Program.280 This is particularly alarming in light of 
data demonstrating that forty-five percent of adults report that a 
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insurance policy.281 However, other flaws may be hindering the 
programs’ success. Partnership Programs do not address high premiums 
which impede purchase rates among the middle class.282 Because the 
purchased LTC insurance must be tax qualified,283 the policy will 
include inflation protection and other features that increase premium 
costs. As a result, these programs have not accounted for a lack of 
access to LTC insurance by those who remain “financially unsuitable” 
to purchase a policy. 
D.  Hybrid Options 
Hybrid product proposals aim to address consumer concerns 
regarding the value of benefits provided under traditional LTC 
insurance policies. Hybrid products combine LTC insurance with other 
types of insurance, for example a life or annuity policy.284 “Combination 
products” were included in the LTC Commission’s Approach A, as a 
mechanism to further reduce adverse selection risks, lower premiums, 
and relax underwriting standards.285 The LTC Commission 
recommended that a change in tax law that would “allow investment 
and distribution in the LTC insurance portion through tax-advantaged 
retirement accounts would encourage creation and uptake of these 
policies.”286 Two types of hybrid products have been particularly 
relevant to the market. First, life insurance hybrids allow individuals 
to pay for LTSS expenses by accelerating the death benefit for a set 
period (i.e., twenty-four or forty-eight months).287 If a policy holder 
never uses the LTC insurance benefit, his or her heir receives the full 
death benefit.288 Second, annuity combination products add LTC 
insurance riders, which allow the individual to pay LTSS expenses out 
of the existing annuity value.289 The hybrid structure provides benefits 
for individual purchasers, including an investment that is not the “use 
it or lose it” model that is risked in LTC insurance.290 Additionally, for 
policies that utilize a single premium, policyholders do not face the risk 
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of premium hikes.291 Life insurance hybrid products purchase rates have 
increased in recent years, from nearly 73,000 in 2009 to over 305,000 in 
2013.292 In 2015, 200,000 hybrid products were sold,293 marking an 
increased interest in hybrid products. 
The strengths of the potential value of these products must be 
evaluated in the context of some weaknesses. First, these products do 
not address accessibility challenges limiting purchase rates in the 
middle class. Life insurance and annuity products require costly 
investments upfront. For example, Fidelity offers a life insurance hybrid 
product to individuals between the ages of thirty-five and sixty-nine 
years old (sixty-five if he or she is a smoker) with a single premium of 
$25,000.294 However, this is at the low end of single premium models, 
other reports of premiums range up to $100,000.295 Thus, purchase rates 
are consistently limited to those with significant assets. Some financial 
advisors advise these products only to individuals with $500,000 to $2 
million in assets.296 Second, hybrid products lack some benefits that are 
included within traditional LTC insurance products. Hybrid products 
may have more limitations on coverage, limited benefit periods, and 
surrender periods (i.e., a waiting period before you can seek benefits).297 
Third, hybrid products do not offer the same tax incentives associated 
with LTC insurance policies because they are not “tax-qualified 
policies.”298 Finally, analysists have also argued that such an investment 
does not provide the best financial benefit, particularly in contrast to 




292. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 11. 
293. Eleanore Laise, Hybrid Insurance Policies Gaining Steam, KIPLINGER 
(Jan. 2017), https://www.kiplinger.com/article/insurance/T036-C000-
S004-hybrid-policies-gaining-steam.html. 
294. Long Term Care, FIDELITY.COM, https://www.fidelity.com/life-
insurance/ long-term-care/details (last visited Nov. 13, 2018). 
295. Universal Life Insurance, FIDELITY.COM, https://www.fidelity.com/life-
insurance/universal-life-insurance/overview?print=true (last visited Nov. 
13, 2018). 
296. John F. Wasik, Hybrid Long-Term Care Policies Provide Case and Leave 




298. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT 
§ 4(A). 
299. Laise, supra note 295. 
Health Matrix·Volume 29·Issue 1·2019 
The Last Hope:  How Starting Over Could Save Private Long-Term Care 
Insurance 
161 
E.  Family and Informal Caregiver Insurance and Financial 
Responsibility 
The critical role of informal caregivers in LTSS has spurred several 
recommendations that focus on the family and friends of individuals 
needing LTSS. These proposals, either recommend that the family 
member be the beneficiary of an insurance product or holding family 
members responsible for financial consequences of LTSS.300 Below are 
two examples representing a larger literature on the role of family 
members and other informal caregivers. 
Allison Hoffman argues that costs to family members and friends 
as caregivers should be the focus of evaluation.301 In her argument, she 
provides extensive evidence of the “next friend” risk.302 Professor 
Hoffman describes “next-friend” risks as those that “arise in service of 
something that we expect people to do and that we perceive as a public 
benefit: providing care for people with serious illness or disability.”303 In 
addition to providing evidence of caregiver burden, Professor Hoffman 
details the historical changes in policy and law that have increased the 
probability that care is provided at home with the use of informal 
caregivers.304 Professor Hoffman proposes a social insurance for next 
friend risk, which would rely on an individual with qualifying disability 
designating a next friend.305 The next friend would receive benefits 
through the social insurance to provide care or pay for services.306 This 
proposal relies on an individual electing to enroll in a social insurance 
and selecting an individual to serve in the “next friend” role. While this 
proposal highlights key challenges facing caregivers, it does not account 
for LTSS needs that extend beyond what informal caregivers can 
provide. As a result, “next friend” social insurance would likely serve 
as a supplement to a broader LTSS financing solution. 
Legal scholars have also promoted the use of filial laws to hold 
family members responsible for the costs of LTSS to mitigate Medicaid 
burden.307 Filial responsibility laws are statutory obligations for family 
members to be financially responsible for a family member, traditionally 
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used to hold parents responsible for children.308 Professor Hopkins and 
colleagues recommend that these laws provide incentives for purchase 
of LTC insurance through partnerships, by creating a disincentive for 
not purchasing LTC insurance.309 This recommendation is limited by 
inconsistent enforcement between states.310 An additional limitation of 
this recommendation is the assumption of traditional familial 
structures, which have continued to evolve. It is possible that the 
enforcement of the filial law could result in an estranged family member 
being held financially responsible for an individual with whom they 
have no real relationship. 
It is clear that family members and friends serve essential roles and 
accept significant risks when serving as an informal caregiver. As a 
result, there may be some place for providing insurance that assists 
caregivers and reduces the burden of serving in this role. It is unclear, 
however, whether the implementation of such a program would resolve 
solutions for individuals who lack access to caregivers and or do not 
exist within traditional family structures. 
IV. Proposal 
This proposal aims to (1) increase accessibility to LTC insurance 
by amending regulation of underwriting practices; (2) improve 
incentives for younger and healthier purchasers to balance the insurance 
pool; and (3) motivate the market through improved regulations that 
protect insurers from consequences of actuarial challenges. The proposal 
prioritizes state legislative amendments as the primary mechanism for 
regulating insurance broadly. To accomplish broad adoption of 
proposed state legislative amendments, I argue for revisions to the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) Long-term 
Care Insurance Model Act and Regulation. The NAIC Model Act and 
Regulation serve as an efficient and feasible tool to spur state 
amendments. However, this proposal recognizes that such amendments 
alone are not sufficient to address challenges to finance LTSS in the 
United States. A successful LTSS financing system will include a 
balance of private and public financing. This proposal seeks to increase 
the role of private LTC insurance and reduce the burden on public 
funding, particularly Medicaid. Reducing this burden will increase 
feasibility to reform public insurance. The proposal begins at the federal 
law, using federal legislation to incentivize states to amend their 
legislation. Second, the proposal describes the NAIC Model Act and 
Regulation as a proxy for state law to identify legislative and regulatory 
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sections that impede a thriving private LTC insurance market. Lastly, 
this proposal will detail specific amendments to the NAIC Model Act, 
with the intention that these amendments will be broadly adopted by 
state legislators and regulators. 
A.  Federal Law to Create State Incentives 
A federal law that triggers state action is the initial step necessary 
to triggering widely adopted changes. While current political dynamics 
may create barriers for legislative amendments that increase regulation 
of LTC insurers at the state level, a well-structured legislative proposal 
could offer benefits to individuals and insurers. This proposal begins 
with a federal act that would create a Medicaid program to provide 
additional funding to states specific to LTSS and create a new Medicaid 
LTSS insurance program that builds upon current coverage, available 
only to individuals who purchase LTC insurance. This borrows from 
the Partnership Programs, with some key differences. First, the 
Medicaid program would supplement LTC insurance by covering 
qualifying LTSS costs during the policy elimination period. This would 
create an additional incentive by mitigating the out-of-pocket expenses 
for individuals with LTC insurance policies. A second option would be 
to tie legislative amendments to Medicaid LTSS catastrophic coverage 
for individuals with LTC insurance policies who experience LTSS costs 
that exceed LTC insurance coverage. 
This proposed federal law will likely face challenges, including those 
challenges raised against the ACA.311 However, historically, federal law 
has used the tax and spending power to encourage state action.312 These 
actions, including Medicaid expansion under the ACA, have previously 
been challenged as violating state rights.313 By creating a new fund, and 
not restricting funds for current programs, this proposal may meet 
relevant constitutional requirements. The full constitutionality of this 
proposal would need an in-depth evaluation, which will be saved for 
another day. For purposes of remodeling the private LTC insurance 
market, the constitutionality of such a federal law and its ability to 
trigger broad state legislative amendments will be assumed. 
The NAIC is a standard setting and regulatory supporting 
organization with membership of insurance commissioners from all fifty 
states, the District of Columbia, and five United States Territories.314  
311. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
312. See id. 
313. See A Guide to the Supreme Court’s Decision on the ACA’s Medicaid 
Expansion, THE KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED (Aug. 1, 
2012), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/issue-brief/a-guide-to-the-
supreme-courts-decision/. 
314. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS, About, http://www.naic.org/ 
index_about.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2018). 
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The NAIC provides peer review, conducts oversight, and establishes 
best practices for insurance regulation in individual states.315 To 
accomplish these goals, the NAIC develops educational materials, 
collects data on state law, and develops model laws to inform state 
legislation and regulation standards and best practices.316 The NAIC 
promulgated the Long-term Care Insurance Model Act (Model Act) and 
Regulation (Model Regulation) to establish standards for LTC 
insurance policies.317 The Model Act aims to promote LTC insurance 
by establishing protections for long-term care applicants from unfair 
and deceptive practices.318 The Model Act provides model language 
among fourteen sections, for example: Definitions, Disclosure and 
Performance Standards for Long-Term Care Insurance, Incontestability 
Period, and Nonforfeiture Benefits.319 
The Model Act was initially promulgated in 1987 and has been 
regularly amended, most recently in 2017.320 Amendments often reflect 
changes in federal law or other policy standards. For example, the 
Model Act and Model Regulation added definitions and standards for 
implementing criteria for “tax-qualified policies” in response to the 1996 
passage of the Health Information Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA), which included a tax benefit for qualified LTC insurance 
policies.321 Since the Model Act’s initial publication in 1987, state 
legislatures have widely adopted it. As of 2015, all fifty states have 
legislation that is either derived from or have fully adopted the Model 
Act.322 In a study examining the Model Act’s “preexisting condition” 
provision,323 twenty-four states were consistent with the Model Act and 
a majority of the remaining states were substantially similar.324 
Evidence of the broad adoption of the Model Act demonstrates the 
influence of the NAIC on informing state LTC insurance legislation and 
regulation. As a result, the NAIC Model Act and Model Regulation 
serve as tools for understanding state law on LTC insurance and for 
amending state law to improve market standards.  
315. Id. 
316. Id. 
317. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT § 1; 
NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL 
REGULATION § 1. 
318. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT § 1. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at § 14. 
321. Id. at § 4. 
322. See id. 
323. Id. at § 6(B). 
324. See Arias et al., supra note 97, at 490. 
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Several Model Act sections have a direct impact on access to LTC 
insurance, benefits and incentives, and protections for the LTC 
insurance market. Premium setting standards permeate multiple 
challenges to a strong private LTC insurance market. First, the Model 
Act and Model Regulation establish baseline standards for setting 
premiums. Premium rate increases require commissioner approval 
which can interfere with insurers’ abilities to adjust rates, even when 
justified by actuarial risk.325 Under the NAIC Model Regulation, 
seventy percent of the premium increases collected must be applied to 
benefits, and insurers must offer a new and comparable policy to 
individuals affected by the increase without underwriting.326 Second, the 
NAIC Model Act and Regulation Insurers provide discretion to regulate 
and approve loss ratios and premium setting practices.327 Under the 
Model Regulation, a loss ratio is reasonable if it is no less than sixty 
percent; meaning that sixty cents of every dollar collected through 
premiums must be used to pay for benefit claims.328 The remainder of 
the proposal will address NAIC Model law as a proxy for state law that 
impacts underwriting and incentives and benefits. 
B.  Underwriting 
Medical denials reduce the pool of eligible participants and limit 
access to LTC insurance. Current state law supports the broad use of 
health information during underwriting.329 The Model Act and Model 
Regulation explicitly permit the use of health information in 
underwriting in multiple sections.330 This can first be seen in the 
mandate that insurers use clear and unambiguous questions to 
“ascertain the health condition of the applicant” accompanies the 
prohibition of post-claim underwriting.331 The same section provides 
mechanisms to rescind a policy or deny benefits due to 
misrepresentation on an application.332 In a related section, the Model 
Regulation requires that the insurer request specific documentation of 
 
325. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 71. 
326. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL 
REGULATION § 20(C), (H). 
327. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT § 6. 
328. Id. at § 5(C). 
329. See Arias et al., supra note 97, at 492. 
330. See id. 
331. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL 
REGULATION § 11(A). 
332. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT 
§ 11(C); NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL 
REGULATION § 11(C). 
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the applicant’s health status if the applicant is over eighty years old.333 
Lastly, the Model Act includes a preexisting condition provision that 
prohibits insurers from using preexisting condition status for coverage 
decisions after a six-month limitation period following enrollment.334 
Importantly, the same provision explicitly permits insurers to use 
health information for underwriting purposes.335 Forty-three states have 
legislative or regulatory provisions that are consistent with the Model 
Act,336 which states “[t]he definition of ‘preexisting condition’ does not 
prohibit an insurer from using an application form designed to elicit the 
complete health history of an applicant, and, on the basis of the answers 
on that application, from underwriting in accordance with the insurers 
established underwriting standards.”337 
This language creates broad unlimited discretion for collecting and 
using health information. Yet, this broad discretion has not yet led to 
accurate actuarial analysis.338 The proposed revised Model Act, and 
subsequently state law, will:  
 
1) create disincentives for withholding health information on 
an application for LTC insurance;  
 
2) remove the barrier for individuals who know of an 
increased risk status from applying for insurance;  
 
3) remove LTC insurance eligibility as a barrier to seeking 
health information that could offer benefit to the 
individual;  
 
4) protect insurer profitability and sustainability by 
permitting insures to collect and use health information, 
in a limited structure, to mitigate adverse selection;  
 
5) reduce the percentage of individuals medically denied;  
 
6) improve accuracy in underwriting practices; and  
 
333. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL 
REGULATION § 11(C)(3). 
334. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT 
§ 6(C)4. 
335. Id. 
336. Arias et al., supra note 96, at 493. 
337. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL ACT 
§ 6(C)4; SHORT-TERM CARE INSURANCE MODEL ACT § 6(B)(4) (NAT’L 
ASS’N OF INS. COMMN’R 2017). 
338. Temkin-Greener et al., supra note 111, at 356. 
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7) ultimately increase the eligibility pool for LTC insurance. 
 
Proposed amendments will create an improved structure that 
specifies boundaries for the use of medical information in underwriting. 
The new structure minimizes the use of knock-out conditions in 
exchange for risk evaluation based on stage and traits of health 
conditions for determining eligibility and premiums. The proposed 
amendments prohibit insurers from using predictive health information 
(i.e., genetic information) from constituting a knock-out condition. 
Insurers would, however, be permitted to use that information to set 
premiums within rate limits established by the insurance commissioner 
and informed by scientific value of predictive information. The 
amendments establish boundaries regarding underwriting for chronic 
conditions that have manifested based on expected disability. 
The proposed amendments incorporate the known loss doctrine to 
reduce potential adverse selection and moral hazard risks for insurers.339 
The known loss doctrine permits insurers to deny coverage for losses 
that the individual insured knew were probable at the time of 
enrollment.340 This would accomplish two purposes (1) protect insurers 
from liability for coverage of claims that the insured knew would occur 
at the time of enrollment; and (2) further discourage insureds from 
failing to disclose risks that were known. 
The proposed amendments harness advances to detect disease risks 
and predictive information and improve actuarially analysis accuracy. 
Diseases that lead to significant functional loss (e.g., Alzheimer’s 
disease) can now be identified at earlier stages.341 Looking to 
Alzheimer’s disease as an example of these advancements can 
demonstrate the outdated approach to LTC insurance underwriting 
currently implemented. Researchers have identified biomarkers of the 
hallmark plaques and tangles associated with Alzheimer’s disease.342 
These biomarkers, which are currently not used clinically for 
asymptomatic individuals, have the capacity to identify disease 
 
339. Diana S. Donaldson & Jennifer DuFault James, The “Known Loss” 
Doctrine – Whose Knowledge and of What?, 8 ENVTL. CLAIMS J. 43, 47-
48 (1996). 
340. Id. 
341. G. McKhann et al., Clinical Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease: Report of 
the NINCDS-ADRDA Work Group Under the Auspices of Department of 
Health and Human Services Task Force on Alzheimer’s Disease, 34 
NEUROLOGY 939 (1984). 
342. Clifford R. Jack et al., NIA-AA Research Framework: Toward a 
Biological Definition of Alzheimer’s Disease, 14 ALZHEIMER’S & 
DEMENTIA 535-36, 539 (2018). 
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pathology up to twenty years prior to symptom onset.343 Individuals 
who are positive for these biomarkers are at an increased risk for 
developing symptomatic Alzheimer’s disease, a leading cause of 
dementia.344 Additionally, genetic markers can identify individuals who 
are at an increased (but rarely certain) risk of Alzheimer’s disease.345 
The widespread movement to diagnose, detect, and treat diseases at 
earlier stages will offer critical public health benefits to reduce disease 
burden. Individuals at risk for disease are, however, likely to be denied 
or face prohibitively high premiums in the LTC insurance underwriting 
process. LTC insurance underwriting practices are unfavorable to 
individuals who will likely need LTSS and could benefit from LTC 
insurance. But, by excluding a population of at-risk enrollees, insurers 
could forgo up to twenty years of premiums without claims. These 
advancements should encourage legal amendments to increase 
eligibility, structure underwriting practices to use different kinds of 
health information, and emphasize the inclusion of scientifically 
accurate information regarding disease to inform actuarial risk 
assessments. 
C.  Proposed Provision: Underwriting Standards Using Health 
Information 
Health information is to be defined as information collected during 
a clinical encounter between an individual (patient) and a health care 
provider with the purpose of improving individual health. Health 
information may include, but is not limited to: diagnostic information, 
treatment status, genetic or other biomarker test results that confer an 
“at risk status,” predictive information indicating future disease status, 
or family health history. 
1. (a)        Insurers  are permitted  to use comprehensive  applications 
to collect health information regarding an applicant’s current or 
future health status as relevant to current or future use of long-
term care services and supports. 
(b) Health information  is not relevant  and may not be 
collected if it does not relate to a current or future (1) disability 
that will interfere with activities of daily living, or (2) cognitive 
impairment requiring supervision. 
 
2. Insurers are prohibited from denying an insurance policy 
application based on genetic information, biomarker 
 
343. See id. at 537, 539. 
344. Id. at 539-40. 
345. Donald H. Taylor Jr et. al., Genetic Testing for Alzheimer’s and Long-
Term Care Insurance, 29 HEALTH AFF. 102, 104 (2010). 
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information, or family history for a risk of future disease: (1) 
if the disease has not yet manifested; and (2) without evidence 
of risk for disease and future loss of function, according to 
medical opinion or documentation in the individual’s disclosed 
medical record. 
 
(a) Insurers may develop a risk scale for determining 
eligibility or premium rates that incorporates applicants’ risk 
for future loss according to genetic or biomarker information 
along with other factors. Factors are to be approved by the 
insurance commissioner and must include, at a minimum, the 
applicant’s age and projected age of onset for the relevant 
disease. 
 
i. Insurers must submit a list of “knock-out” conditions and 
seek approval from the insurance commissioner for 
conditions that the insurer will deny based on genetic or 
biomarker risk for a debilitating illness, when the disease 
has yet to manifest. 
 
ii. Insurers are not permitted to limit or deny benefit claims 
based on genetic information or biomarkers for a disease 
that is inconsistent with treatment of other preexisting 
conditions as established in National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners Model Act §5(C) (year). 
 
(b) An insurer may deny an application based on genetic 
or biomarker risk information for a condition if: 
 
i. The disease has manifested and the applicant is projected 
to seek benefits from the policy within 3 years of enrollment 
based on current medical opinion and standards; or 
 
ii. The disease has not yet manifested, but the applicant is 
within 2 years of expected age of onset with a rapid 
progressing disease, according to current medical standards 
related to the specific disease process. 
 
3. (a)     An  insurer  may deny a policy  application  for an 
individual who is diagnosed and symptomatic for an illness or 
condition that the insurance commissioner has designated “high 
risk.” 
 
(b) The insurance commissioner shall maintain criteria 
and a list of conditions that constitute “high risk.” “High risk” 
shall not be defined more restrictively than a condition that will 
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lead to catastrophically high LTSS costs which cannot be 
covered by projected premiums. 
 
4. Insurers may develop an underwriting “scale of risk” to be used 
internally for determining eligibility or premium rates that 
incorporates applicants’ risk for future loss based on diagnoses 
of a chronic condition or illness that will lead to loss of function. 
A proposed scale must be approved by the insurance 
commissioner and be based on the individual’s age and 
projected long-term care services and supports needs. 
 
5. (a)       An insurer is prohibited  from denying  an application 
for conditions that constitute a “minimal risk.” 
 
(b)      The insurance  commissioner shall  maintain  criteria 
and a list of conditions that constitute “minimal risk.” 
“Minimal risk” shall not be defined more restrictively than a 
condition that will not lead to significant long-term care 
services and supports costs, is unlikely to lead to disability that 
would interfere with daily activities, or is unlikely to require the 
use of long-term care services and supports within 20 years of 
enrollment. 
6. Insurers may develop a risk scale for determining eligibility or 
premium rates that incorporates applicants’ risk for future loss 
according to past medical history only as predictive of future 
functional loss. A proposed scale must be approved by the 
insurance commissioner and be based on the individual’s age 
and projected long-term care services and supports needs.  
 
7. The known loss doctrine shall apply. Insurers are not liable for 
coverage of long-term care services and supports costs 
associated with disability that the insured knew would occur at 
the time of enrollment. This doctrine does not grant insurers 
the authority to require or request diagnostic, risk, or predictive 
biomarker or genetic tests. 
D. Discussion of Proposal 
The proposed amendments’ language incorporates new standards 
for using health information for underwriting purposes. The 
amendments adopt a balance between absolutely prohibiting LTC 
insurers to use health information and providing broad discretion. The 
proposed regulation would provide additional implementation language, 
including a medical certification process for amendments that include 
prognostic information (e.g., “within 2 years of the expected onset”). 
The proposed language and amendments are extensive and add 
additional layers of complexity. However, this additional detailed 
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approach of evaluating policyholder risk will lead to improved accuracy 
in the underwriting process. An alternative approach would be to 
implement a community rating structure; a consistent rate set across 
all individuals would reduce the consequences of medical 
underwriting.346 In the context of a voluntary enrollment program, 
community rating may increase adverse selection. Community rating 
may dissuade younger and healthier individuals from enrolling if they 
will face similar premiums as their older and less healthy counterparts. 
A revised underwriting structure provides the core revisions to this 
proposal and seeks to provide access to LTC insurance to an expanded 
population. This will also increase the size of the insured population. 
Therefore, risks will be more broadly distributed. The continued, but 
restricted, use of health information permits insurers to screen for high 
risk policyholders. This restricted structure addresses one of the 
limitations in the CLASS Act. The proposed underwriting amendments 
will trigger other changes throughout the LTC insurance market, 
including lowering premiums. Therefore, in order to protect the market, 
additional measures must be initiated, including improving the quality 
of LTC insurance as a product and providing market incentives. 
E.  Incentives and Benefits 
Incentives and policy benefits will be critical to motivating younger 
and healthier individuals to purchase LTC insurance policies. Increasing 
the number of younger and healthier purchasers is essential to maintain 
a voluntary market and support the newly revised underwriting 
practices. Incentives can include the benefits provided under a policy 
as well as the external incentives which influence individual or insurers’ 
decision to participate in the market. This proposal recommends 
improved benefits that reduce barriers to accessing LTSS, external 
incentives to encourage individual participation, and market incentives 
for insurers. 
1. Improving Purchase Rates and an Improved Insurance Product 
Incentives include positive and negative influences to motivate 
behavior. In the context of LTC insurance a balance between the two 
may be most successful. Policy benefits and external incentives increase 
the value of a policy in relationship to the associated premiums. 
Disincentives, including penalties, may discourage individuals from 
waiting to enroll until later in life or when chronic conditions begin. 
 
346. Thomas D. Snook & Ronald G. Harris, Adverse Selection and the 
Individual Mandate, MILLIMAN HEALTH REFORM BRIEFING PAPER, Oct. 
2009. 
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a. Policy Benefits 
LTC insurance policy benefits are limited by benefit triggers, 
benefit caps, and elimination periods. As a result, LTC insurance 
policyholders must still pay for a portion of LTSS expenses. In order to 
improve the value of an LTC insurance policy, the entire structure must 
be redesigned to increase the benefit to the purchaser without overly 
increasing premiums. 
The proposed new structure shifts LTC insurance from a premium 
model to an accumulation or savings model. This proposal is consistent 
with evidence of consumer criticism that policies do not include non-
forfeiture benefits, which would allow policyholders to receive a refund 
on a portion of premiums.347 An accumulation model would provide 
purchasers with the option to receive a refund of a percentage of 
premiums at a designated time point (i.e., a given age or years paid 
into a policy). Here the model would incorporate a non-use premium 
refund that would provide policyholders with a refund if, at reaching 
the given time point, they have not needed LTSS or sought benefits 
under their policy. The refund would increase based on premiums paid, 
which would encourage younger purchasers. This model could also be 
used as a disincentive by requiring purchase by a specified age to qualify 
for the non-use refund benefit. An accumulation model could also 
encourage healthy behavior and address risks of moral hazards to limit 
the use of LTSS. 
There are potential consequences of incentivizing non-use of 
benefits, including sub-par care. Additionally, specific protections 
would be needed to limit the risk of abuse and conflict of interest for 
caregivers who serve as decision-makers. A caregiver may be improperly 
motivated by the refund and refrain from seeking LTSS on behalf of 
the individual, despite needs for services. Criteria and regulation of 
refunds could address these risks (e.g., requiring certification of “non-
need” by a health care provider).348 Practically, policy makers would 
need to conduct analysis to establish standards, including the “purchase 
by” age and refund percentages. This will also require negotiation with 
insurers to avoid disrupting the market by loss of profit associated with 
refunds. This restructuring would require new legislative language and 
re-defining LTC insurance. 
Current use of benefit triggers, elimination periods, and benefit 
limits serve an important role to reduce claims costs and reduce 
premiums. However, these are the same mechanisms which are cited as 
impeding individuals from perceiving LTC insurance as a valuable 
 
347. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23, at 4. 
348. COMMITTEE ON FAMILY CAREGIVING FOR OLDER ADULTS, FAMILIES 
CARING FOR AGING AMERICA, 13 (Richard Schulz & Jill Eden, eds., 2016). 
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product.349 Benefit triggers provide an important role in assuring 
appropriate use of LTC insurance benefits for LTSS services. Under the 
NAIC Model regulation, an LTC insurance policy “shall condition the 
payment of benefits on the determination of the insured’s ability to 
perform activities of daily living and on cognitive impairment.” While 
benefit triggers create a hurdle for individuals, the availability of an 
appeal process under the Model Regulation provides oversight on the 
process.350 To mitigate the adverse consequences of the elimination 
period, the proposed Medicaid fund provided to states would provide 
coverage during the elimination period. 
This leaves the adverse effects of benefit caps. There are two 
underlying components of addressing caps. First, excessive LTSS costs 
could contribute to the gap between policy benefits and cost of care. 
Cost reform is not a focus of this article but should be recognized as a 
contributor to financing issues. Second, benefit caps are important to 
protect insurers from losses exceeding premium contributions of 
policyholders. Insurer protections, including the “vesting” period 
proposed in the CLASS Act, may provide a mechanism to assure that 
policyholders have contributed sufficient funds to support increasing 
benefit caps and minimize the gap between benefits and LTSS costs. 
Addressing the consequences of benefit triggers, elimination periods, 
and benefit caps will increase the value of an LTC insurance policy and 
motivate purchasers. These revisions do not address the need to 
incentivize purchase in the middle class. External benefits may help fill 
that role. 
b. External Benefits 
Prior tax incentives have been nominally successful at improving 
purchase rates and unsuccessful at motivating the middle class to 
purchase policies.351 Prior research has demonstrated that tax and other 
financial incentives are broadly supported, including government 
support of LTC insurance purchase using funds from an individual 
retirement account.352 A strategic approach which accounts for the 
financial realities of the middle class will be the key element of a 
successful external incentive. I propose a tax incentive available only to 
individuals whose income classify them as “middle class” in their 
geographical area. Such a mechanism would overcome a critical hurdle 
of incentivizing purchase by individuals in the middle class, an outcome 
not previously achieved. A specific tax benefit or subsidy as part of this 
 
349. See NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 51. 
350. NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS LONG-TERM CARE INS. MODEL 
REGULATION § 31(D)(1). 
351. NORDMAN, supra note 42, at 21. 
352. DOTY & SHIPLEY, supra note 23. 
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model would require a larger analysis to determine what degree of 
incentive would motivate the target population to change behavior. 
c. Disincentives 
An individual mandate for LTC insurance is politically 
implausible.353 However, other potential disincentives could encourage 
earlier purchase of LTC insurance. For example, implementing penalties 
for enrolling after a specific age may increase younger purchase rates. 
There are multiple options for developing penalties, depending on fiscal 
and economic feasibility. For example, individuals who enroll after 
sixty-five face a penalty, but not a total block, for seeking coverage 
within two years of the policy enrollment date. This type of penalty 
would need to be designed to not override current preexisting condition 
protections, which currently prohibit insurers from denying coverage 
based on a preexisting condition after a six-month limitation. 
Regardless of the type of disincentive chosen, a successful disincentive 
will balance encouraging purchase rates and protecting the market, but 
not creating barriers to accessing LTC insurance or services. In this 
context, penalties (e.g., standardized increased premiums), criteria for 
incentives, and the non-benefit refund that are focused towards specific 
populations (i.e., older purchasers) would motivate purchase without 
barring access. 
2. Market Incentives 
The primary focus of this proposal is to improve LTC insurance as 
a product, make it more accessible, and increase purchase rates. 
However, this proposal must include incentives for insurers to join and 
stay in the market. Without such incentives, the proposal is at risk of 
failure by over emphasizing protections which will benefit policyholders, 
but potentially deplete profits of insurers to the detriment of the 
market. Specifically, increasing the eligibility and accessibility of 
insurance can disrupt the market by increasing rates of adverse 
selection.354 Additionally, without additional regulatory market 
incentives, insurers may attempt to compete by making their policies 
less attractive to “sicker” or less ideal policy holders through the 
benefits offered or terms of their policies (e.g., elimination periods), 
undermining the goals of the proposal.355 This article proposes a time 
limited federal subsidy for LTC insurers and modeling mechanism 
implemented in the ACA. The ACA incorporated measures including 
reinsurance, risk corridors, and risk adjustment (the “Three R’s”) to  
353. Feder, supra note 86, at 59. 
354. CYNTHIA COX ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH 
CARE REFORM: RISK ADJUSTMENT, REINSURANCE, AND RISK CORRIDORS 
(2016). 
355. Id. 
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accomplish broader goals, reduce the consequences of adverse selection, 
and minimize the impact of moral hazard.356 
Risk adjustment aims to de-incentivize risk selection practices that 
prioritization of “ideal” candidates.357 Risk adjustment balances the 
market by distributing funds from insurers with practices that lead to 
healthier enrollees to insurer who accept high risk enrollees.358 
Reinsurance insures against the potential catastrophic consequences for 
insurers who experience high expenses or costs due to rare claims by 
policy holders.359 The program was implemented to stabilize the health 
insurance market.360 Under the ACA, the federal government reinsures 
companies by paying a percentage of the rare policy holder claims that 
exceed a specific amount.361 This program had a step down and limited 
application between 2014 and 2016.362 The government paid the highest 
percentage in 2014, decreased the percentage in 2015, and ended the 
program in 2016.363 In the three years that the ACA reinsurance 
program was in effect, premiums dropped in the individual health 
insurance market as much as eleven percent.364 Risk corridors aim to 
incentivize accurate premium calculations by re-distributing financial 
gains or losses that exceed predicted loss or gains.365 Under the ACA, if 
an insurer’s gains or losses are within three percent of those predicted, 
the company absorbed the financial consequences.366 However, if the 
gains or losses are between three and eight percent, the company was 
either reimbursed or contributed fifty percent of the gains or losses for 
redistribution.367 
 
356. Id. at 12. 
357. Id. at 3. 
358. Id. 
359. Id. at 6. 
360. Id. 
361. Id. at 10. 
362. See id. at 11-12. 
363. Id. 
364. Timothy Jost, CMS Releases 2016 ACA Marketplace Reinsurance and 
Risk Adjustment Data, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (July 1, 2017), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170701.060929/full/. 
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A targeted goal of the ACA was to expand and improve coverage, 
much like the goals established in this article.368 In the context of health 
insurance, the ACA was successful at accomplish those goals through 
the end of President Obama’s presidency.369 However, the ACA faced 
political challenges370 which are informative when considering a reform 
for LTC insurance, which is engendered with significant complexities. 
The ACA also included the individual mandate, which has seen been 
repealed.371 Given the political challenges associated with the ACA, a 
reform for LTC insurance must be tempered and avoid the naïve trap 
of believing that directly modeling any reform after the ACA would 
necessarily be successful. However, implementing the Three R’s 
approach to incentivize market participation would improve market 
security to allow for insurers to bare additional risks associated with 
proposals that increase eligibility. These measures (the Three R’s) 
would protect insurers from losses, incentivize change in underwriting 
practices, and reduce the impact of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
However, several challenges will need to be addressed, including the 
potential consequences of implementing these measures in a market 
within a market that has fewer insurers than the health insurance 
market. This is particularly relevant when considering risk adjustment, 
which incorporates distribution of funds between insurers. As a result, 
these mechanisms will only be successful with a growth in the number 
of insurers in the market. A federal subsidy or corporate tax benefit for 
new insurers to enter the market and for current insurers will help 
increase the number of insurers and provide the necessary financial 
environment for adopting the Three R’s. 
V. Conclusions and Limitations 
The proposal has some limitations and challenges that need to be 
addressed before implementation. Primarily, an economic analysis is 
needed to simulate potential changes proposed. This would include 
evaluating feasibility of market changes to adjust premiums and 
calculate ranges for incentives to appropriately motivate purchase rates. 
The purpose of this article was to identify a route for revisions through 
current legal standards, the economic analysis would be a natural next 
step. Additional practical limitations include political hurdles to  
368. Barack Obama, United States Health Care Reform Progress to Date and 
Next Steps, JAMA 525, 526 (2016). 
369. Id. at 527. 
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propose amendments through the legislative process. Political 
challenges would be closely related to financial solutions for the 
proposal, including any investment by public governments. 
Resolving failures plaguing private LTC insurance will not “fix” all 
financing challenges facing LTSS. However, strengthening the private 
market will reduce the burden placed on individuals and Medicaid. A 
public option, including those recommended by the LTC Commission, 
will be central to a balanced solution. Public options are particularly 
important options for individuals without financial means to purchase 
private insurance. Despite these limitations, improving the private LTC 
insurance market is a promising avenue to improving LTSS financing 
options. 
This article proposes redesigning the current LTC insurance model 
using the NAIC Long-term Care Insurance Model Act to establish new 
state legislative standards. This proposal is the first to closely 
evaluating characteristics and insurers’ practices that are contributing 
to LTC insurance market failure and low purchase rates. The solution 
proposed is the first of its kind and addresses the limitations of 
previously proposed solutions. The article’s proposals to increase access 
through revised underwriting standards, improve incentives to purchase 
LTC insurance, and integrate market protections reflect critical changes 
to save LTC insurance from the “death spiral.” 
